The Battle of Britain
July to October 1940 

 Coastal Command

© HMSO 1942
Avro Ansons of Coastal Command were the mainstay during the early phases of the battle.

Formed 1 May 1936, the Command originally consisted of 3 Groups, 15, 16 and 18. By the outbreak of war the state of readiness lagged behind that of both Bomber and Fighter Commands and of the 19 squadrons in the Command, all but six were equipped with land-based aircraft, mostly Avro Ansons. Only one, (224 Sqn), was equipped with Hudsons.

 This graphically illustrated the fact that nothing had been learnt from WW.I. As before, Britain's sea routes were under threat from the Kriegsmarine, but the Royal Navy had pinned its faith in ASDIC, (Allied Submarine Investigation Committee), a ship-borne sonic detection system first developed in 1917. The Navy had not seen fit to consider aircraft as a means to destroy U-Boats. Furthermore, no consideration had been given to the use of aircraft as a means to detect enemy surface forces, against which ASDIC was useless. Therefore in the Navy's view the role of Coastal Command was North Sea reconnaissance.

 Even then, the Command had great difficulty in completing this role with the antiquated and problematical aircraft at its disposal. The best of its aircraft, the Short Sunderland, was to be replaced by the Saro Lerwick thus allowing Short Brothers to concentrate on the Stirling, currently on order by Bomber Command, but the Lerwick was a spectacular failure. By then orders for the Sunderland had been cancelled and although a few were supplied the Command had to fall back on vintage Stranraer's and London's.

 The lesson was learnt very quickly when on, 14 October 1940, U-Boats slipped unnoticed into the North Sea and then into Scapa Flow to sink the Royal Oak. The Home Fleet was forced to shelter in the Western Isles until February 1940.

 This rather made a nonsense of the stated reconnaissance role as, in the event that enemy shipping was seen as the Fleet could not be called upon to help and the striking power of the operational aircraft themselves was negligible.

 The Avro Anson was a civil aircraft modified for military use. Its fragility and short range did not even allow it to reach the coast of Norway. Air Ministry instructions prohibited the use of any violent manoeuvres, speeds in excess of 200 mph, or spinning. The Vildebeest was an even more alarming prospect, a slow, cumbersome biplane quite unsuited to role of torpedo bomber for the fast moving conflict ahead.

  Coastal Command's operational area extended from the southern tip of Greenland in the west to Norway and then south to occupied France and the Western Approaches It was an impossible task. It was therefore necessary to lend support from the already depleted Bomber and Fighter Commands to conduct mine-laying, anti-shipping strikes and convoy escort duties.

 Dowding had stated his extreme reluctance to protect convoys in the North Sea and Channel as, in his view, these were "flag-waving" exercises. The ships were carrying coal that would have been far more economical to transport by rail. Additionally, their protection was incurring losses among his fighters before the main part of the battle had started. Needless to say, this point of view did not win him many friends in the Admiralty.

 However, the Battle of the Atlantic had started. Between June and December 1940 an average of 425,000 tons of shipping were lost each month. To combat this, and despite the obstacles, the Command began to develop an anti-submarine role, albeit before suitable aircraft and ordnance were available. The first 45 of 4,000 ASV Mk I sets were installed in Hudsons in August 1940 and, despite their limitation and 3½ mile range, signalled the beginnings of a new and powerful fighting arm.

 The cost was high, Terraine (The Right of the Line pp219-220), calculates that during this period the Command lost 130 aircraft and a total of 230 crew. By the end of 1940, 323 aircraft had been lost (ibid p 244).

 Air Sea Rescue: "The Sea Shall Not Have Them"
In August 1941 the role of air/sea rescue was added to Coastal Command's ever-increasing area of responsibility: Previously this responsibility had been loosely held, first by the Directorate of Air Sea Rescue under the command of Air Cdre D G Donald, and later by the Directorate General of Aircraft Safety.

A miscellany of sea-going vessels were operated by RAF crews including a number of High Speed Launches (HSL) for the ASR role. in addition to aircraft there were RAF tenders and high-speed launches sent out to retrieve downed air crew. Aircraft were to some extent expendable but experienced crews were not. The Command raised this additional duty to the status of an art form by rescuing an average 30% of downed airman between 1940 and 1945.

Minelaying code areas

Anenomies Le Havre Melon Kiel Canal
Artichokes Lorient Mullett Spezia
Asparagus Great Belt Mussels Terschilling Gat
Barnacle Zeebrugge Nasturtiums The Sound
Beech St Nazaire Nectarines Frisian Islands
Bottle Haugesund Newt Maas and Scheldt
Broccoli Great Belt Onions Oslo
Carrots Little Belt Oysters Rotterdam
Cinnemon La Rochelle Prawns Calais
Cypress Dunkirk Privet Danzig
Daffodil The Sound Pumpkins Great Belt
Deodar Bordeaux Quinces Great Belt
Dewberry Boulogne Radishes Kiel Bay
Eglantine Heligoland Approaches Rosemary Heligoland
Elderberry Bayonne Scallops Rouen
Endives Little Belt Silverthorn Kattegat
Flounder Maas and Scheldt Sweet Peas Rostock and Arcone Light
Forget-me-nots Kiel Canal Tangerine Pillau
Furze St Jean de Luz Tomatoes Oslo Fjord
Hawthorn Esbjerg Approaches Trefoils South Texel
Hollyhocks Travemunde Turbot Ostend
Hyacinth St Malo Undergrowth Kattegat
Geranium Swinemunde Verbena Copenhagen Approaches
Gorse Quiberon Vine Leaves Dieppe
Greengage Cherbourg Wallflowers Kiel Bay
Jasmine Travemunde Whelks Zuider Zee
Jellyfish Brest Willow Arcona to River Dievenow
Juniper Antwerp Xeranthmums River Jade
Krauts Lim Fjord Yams Heligiland Approaches
Lettuces Kiel Canal Yewtree Kattegat
Limpets Den Helder Zinneas River Jade